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Reregulation and the Regulatory Timeline
Peter Molk* & Arden RowellABSTRACT: Regulation is often casually conceived of as functioning like a
binary on/off switch: as if an area, issue, or industry is either regulated or
not. While this binary model of regulation can be useful, it also
decontextualizes regulatory decisionsfrom their position in time, and thus
obscures importantways by which regulatorsare constrainedand incentivized
by past and future decisions. As an alternative, we present a timeline
approach to regulation. The timeline approach is particularly helpful in
illustratingthe ways that earlierregulatorydecisions create vestigial effectsfor
laterrelateddecisions, andfor highlightingthe informationaladvantagethat
later regulators have over regulators earlier in the timeline. These temporally
contextualized qualities are especially important under conditions of
reregulation, which arise when a previously deregulated issue is regulated
once again. Applying insightsfrom financial option theory, we show how
lessonsfrom the timeline approachcan be used to enhance regulatory decisionmaking at all stages on the timeline.
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INTRODUCTION

In the modern regulatory state, regulations-agency-made law-are in a
constant state of flux. Regulators regulate new industries; those regulations
are later unwound through deregulation; and changing circumstances then
drive a need for renewed regulatory approaches. The result is a complex and
trembling web of regulatory influence that is constantly being woven,
unwoven, and rewoven.
Experts sometimes describe these shifting regulatory landscapes as
following a "cycle" or "sine wave," swinging like a "pendulum," or "oscillating,"

i. Throughout this Article we use "regulator" to mean an implementer of regulatory policy.
Thus, regulators include actors engaged in what we call initial regulation (the first meaningful
regulation of an area, issue, or industry), regulatory reform (substantive changes to existing
regulation), deregulation (the rolling back of an existing regulatory policy), and reregulation
(regulating a previously deregulated industry). The exact boundaries of each of these tasks is likely
to be fluid, but we will argue that regulators at various stages of a timeline nevertheless tend to face
different challenges and opportunities when engaging in regulatory action.
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as an industry is first regulated and later deregulated or subjected to
regulatory change.2 These metaphors all imply a binary regulatory process,
with regulation functioning essentially like a flip switch: either "on"
(regulation) or "off" (deregulation). Under this mentality, the decision to
regulate after a period of deregulation-what we refer to as reregulationslooks just like the decision to regulate an industry initially: in both cases,
regulation is merely "switched on." From this perspective, the intervening
deregulation serves to roll back the clock, as if the initial regulation had never
happened.
Binary models of regulation capture much that is important about how
regulation functions. They are particularly helpful for emphasizing
distinctions between the two prongs of the "regulated" and "not regulated"
dichotomy, and for highlighting similarities within periods of regulation and
of non-regulation. They can also be useful for emphasizing the type of
political oscillation that is most likely to occur under a two-party political
system, and how such oscillation is likely to press upon administrative
agencies.4

2.
See, e.g., Walter R. Burkley, EnvironmentalReform in an Era offPoliticalDiscontent, 49 VAND.
L. REV. 677, 678 n.4 (1996) (referring to the "oscillations in environmental regulation"); John
C. Coffee, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of Dodd-Frank: Why FinancialReform Tends to Be Frustratedand
Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1029 (2012) (defining the phrase "Regulatory
Sine Curve" as characterizing regulation in, among other industries, finance and environmental
regulation); Richard D. Cudahy, Retail Wheeling: Is This Revolution Necessary?, 25 ENERGY L.J. 161,
163 n. 16 (2004) (referring to the "pendulum-like oscillation... between regulation and
competition"); Patrick McGinley, CollateralDamage: Turning a Blind Eye to Environmentaland Social
Injustice in the Coalfiells, igJ. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILUTYL. 304, 385 n.265 (2013) (referring to the
"repeating cycle" of environmental safety regulation); Anne Joseph O'Connell, PoliticalCycles of
Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889 (2008)
(tracking the "cycles" of rulemaking by following political transitions); Larry E. Ribstein,
Commentary, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REV. 77, 79-83 (2003) (developing a "cycle" of financial
regulation). On occasion both the regulatory framework and the accompanying industry
response are described this way. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Shapeshifting Corporations, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 261, 284-85 (2009) (analyzing the cycling of corporations between public and private
ownership due to changing regulatory environments).
3. Although "reregulation" is a term occasionally used in the literature, in the past, it has
lacked any generally accepted definition. See, e.g., Nicole Fradette et al., Project: Regulatory Reform:
A Survey of the Impact of Reregulationand Deregulation on Selected Industies and Sectors, 47 ADMIN. L.
REV. 461 (1995) (writing a 2oo-page study that never defines or expands on the term); Barry R.
Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clientele
Relationships, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981) (failing to define or expand on the term);

see also ALAN GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION, REREGULATION: THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING,
INSURANCE, AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES (1994) (using "reregulation" variously to encompass our

view of reregulation and as what we call regulatory reform). But seeJeff Schwartz, The Twilight of
Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 6oo-o2 (2012) (using "reregulation" to refer to the
period of regulation following deregulation, as the term is used in this Article).
4. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 2 (tracking the "cycles" of administrative regulation as
they are affected by political oscillation between two parties).
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Yet we worry that the binary narrative might also obfuscate a key aspect
of regulatory decision-making: its temporal context. Any regulatory decision
entwines with prior and future regulatory decisions: the impacts of a single
current regulation are determined, in part, by past policy decisions; and will
determine, in part, the costs and benefits of future policy decisions. When
regulatory policy is treated categorically, it can obscure the fact that the same
policy may have very different impacts-both on the area being regulated and
on future regulators working in the same area--depending upon the time
and conditions under which it is implemented.
To illustrate the importance of temporal context to regulatory policy, we
present a timeline approachto regulatory decision-making as a complementary
alternative to the more familiar binary approach. The timeline approach
analyzes regulatory decisions along a timeline, and thus helps capture the
ways in which regulatory decisions differ depending upon their temporal
context. The import of temporal contextualization is particularly clear for
reregulatory decisions: for such decisions, we will argue that the timeline
approach helps reveal how the decision to reregulate can be very different
from the decision to enact initial regulation, even when the policies
themselves look similar on their face.
In our view, the timeline approach highlights two distinctive aspects of
reregulatory decisions that can otherwise be obscured by the binary approach.
First, earlier decisions on a timeline can fundamentally change the underlying
behaviors and industries being regulated, introducing vestigial effects that alter
the position of the reregulator from that of the initial regulator. In other
words, policies themselves can create impacts that change the landscapes of
costs and benefits faced by future regulators. Because of this, the reregulator
may face neither the same challenges nor the same suite of feasibly
implementable policies as the initial regulator.
Second, experiences with regulation and deregulation provide the
reregulator with opportunities for learning how regulatory policy affects the
underlying behaviors or industry. This means that even where the underlying
behavior or industry does not change, the reregulator's knowledge of what is
being regulated-and how it responds to regulation-may have developed
beyond what would have been possible for the initial regulator. This also
creates differences between reregulators and policymakers situated earlier on
a regulatory timeline.
We believe that the chief prescriptive implication of the timeline
approach is that it demonstrates that regulators have the opportunity to shape
the future of regulatory policy by adopting current policies that affect future
policies' cost-benefit landscape. This is true regardless of where on a timeline
the regulatory decision occurs-for initial regulation, deregulation,
reregulation, and intervening or subsequent regulatory reform. Current
policies might reduce future costs of policy change, as by implementing
structured data-gathering or information-generating mechanisms into
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existing policies, thereby reducing the cost of future information. Or they
might increase future costs, as by implementing strategies with significant
vestigial effects that make it more difficult for future regulators to adopt
alternative strategies for regulating the affected market. Either way, the
timeline approach helps illustrate that regulatory decisions have impacts onand are impacted by-notjust the market or target they seek to regulate, but
also for and by related regulatory decisions through time.
We use Part II of this Article to further outline the concept of a regulatory
timeline. We describe the operation of a regulatory timeline, explain how it
fits within current methods of regulatory decision-making, and identify the
ways in which initial regulation, deregulation, and reregulation can and do
interact with one another. Because we believe that the stage of reregulation
exemplifies the distinction between a binary and a timeline approach, we then
develop the category of reregulation further. We emphasize two ways in which
reregulatory decisions differ from prior regulatory decisions along the same
timeline: because they must account for the vestigial effects of past regimes,
and because they are informed by the opportunity to learn from past regimes.
Part III argues that the timeline approach to regulation helps reveal ways
regulators can strategically (or even accidentally) obstruct or facilitate
regulatory change, in turn entrenching or making vulnerable their policy of
choice. The ability to impose vestigial effects and learning opportunities on
the future can affect future cost-benefit analyses, influencing the policies that
future regulators ultimately adopt.
In Part IV, we develop two prescriptions for how regulators might
manage the regulatory challenges and opportunities that are highlighted by
the timeline approach. The first (modest) prescription is that regulators
might be further encouraged to adopt transparent mechanisms for setting
temporal scope when performing Regulatory Impact Analyses. Although
transparency in scoping is already encouraged by executive guidance,
understanding more of the implications of that transparency should provide
a refreshed and heightened call for enforcing the recommendations already
in place. The second set of prescriptions presents a range of possible
approaches to systemizing analysis of the intertemporal dependence among
regulatory decisions at different points on a timeline. The easiest, cheapest,
and least formal of these approaches would simply involve a qualitative
discussion of intertemporal decision-making impacts; the most formal would
provide a platform for integrating insights from financial option pricing
theory into current regulatory analysis.
II.

THE REGULATORY TIMELINE

This Part presents the concept of the regulatory timeline as a tool for
portraying the progression of regulatory actions through time. It argues that
a timeline approach, in contrast or complement to a binary approach, offers
two valuable benefits: it allows regulators to identify and evaluate the very real
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interdependent relationships among past, present, and future regulatory
decisions, and it can be used to discipline the temporal scope with which a
regulatory decision is concerned. We then address the position of
reregulation as a phase in the regulatory timeline, and apply timeline-based
analysis to identify two characteristics of reregulation that arise from its
position on the regulatory timeline that distinguish it from prior decisions
along the same timeline: (1) vestigial effects from prior regulatory phases; and
(2) opportunities for learning from the application of multiple regulatory
policies to the same underlying condition(s).
A.

THE REGULATORY TIMELINE

The timeline approach to regulatory decision-making holds that
regulatory decisions should be understood as being temporally situated: as
occurring at a particular point in time, which happens before some events
and after others.
A timeline can, of course, be represented in many different ways, but
even a very simple form can help illustrate the features of the approach. For
the remainder of the discussion in this Subpart, then, consider this timeline:
Figure i. A Simple Regulatory Timeline
Time-Point A
"Initial Regulation"

Time-Point B
"Deregulation"

Time-Point C
"Reregulation"

)i9*

Timelines can assist regulators and analysts by illustrating two important
characteristics common to regulatory decision-making contexts: temporal
scope and intertemporal dependence. We begin below by discussing temporal
scope, or the notion that the length of time with which regulators concern
themselves informs the substance of regulatory decision-making. We then
discuss the more complex notion of intertemporal dependence, or the idea
that different stages of regulatory policy should properly be construed as
related to and dependent upon one another, rather than viewed as a series of
isolated, independent events.

1. Temporal Scope
With what length of time-both in the future and in the past-should
regulators be concerned? The answer to this question determines the
temporal scope of a regulatory analysis: the distance that the line segment is
considered to extend both before and after the time-point of the decision.
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One important feature of the timeline approach is that it helps foreground
the strategic selection of scope.
Consider, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency's decision
about whether to site U.S. hazardous waste disposal at Yucca Mountain in
Nevada. EPA chose to base its analyses on an endpoint o,ooo years in the
future, despite recommendations from the National Academy of Science to
use a i,ooo,ooo year prospective temporal scope;5 the difference between the
two scopes would determine how hazardous nuclear waste could be stored at
Yucca Mountain.6 The D.C. Circuit overturned the EPA's decision on review
for failing to explain adequately their decision to use io,ooo years as the
relevant temporal scope,7 and the EPA consequently adopted a 1,ooo,ooo
year temporal scope for future decision-making regarding hazardous nuclear
waste disposal. 8
The prospective temporal scope is not the only paradigm that matters,
however; regulators' retrospective scope can also alter the regulatory actions
they take. As we will shortly discuss, intertemporal dependence implies that
earlier events can constrain or facilitate regulatory action at a later time. Thus,
the circumstances regulators currently face are often due to a complex causal
chain of prior events. The longer the retrospective temporal scope that
regulators adopt for these prior events, the more comprehensive picture they
will develop for the causal chain.
For instance, a myopic view of the current financial crisis might attribute
it solely to the precipitating economic downturn, so that the regulatory fix
would be to address the current downturn. Lengthening the retrospective
temporal scope, a regulator might also attribute the crisis to banks' willingness
to issue subprime mortgage loans, and try to fix that as well. Looking further
back, the deregulator might also think that the demand for these risky loans
was influenced by the conversion of investment houses like Goldman Sachs to
limited liability corporate forms, which incentivized them to undertake more
risko so the regulator might try to address this as well. Or a regulator with an
even longer retrospective temporal scope might also decide that repeal of the
Depression-era Glass-Steagall banking reform was the key precipitating cause,
and advocate for its reimplementation.1o The point here is that temporal

See Arden Rowell, Time in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1215, 1233 n.86
(discussing the implications of the scope determination for Yucca Mountain).
6. See COMM. ON TECH. BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS ET AL., TECHNICAL BASES
FORYUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS (1995); see alsoNuclear Energy Inst, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
373 F.3d 1251, 1266-73 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
7. NuclearEnergy Inst., Inc., 373 F.3 d at 1266-73.
8. 4 0 C.F.R. § 197.12 (2015).
9. See Avik Roy, Want to Improve Goldman Sachs? Convert It Back into a Partnership,FORBES
(Mar. 14, 2012, 11:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2o12/03/1 4 /want-to-improvegoldman-sachs-convert-it-back-into-a-partnership.
lo. See infraPart II.B.
5.

(2014)
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scope matters notjust for estimating an action's impact on the future, but also
for identifying the cause or causes of the phenomenon the regulation is
designed to address.1
It is not uncommon for regulators to be relatively haphazard when
selecting regulatory scope. EPA's largely unexplained choice of temporal
scope for Yucca Mountain was not unique: regulators across agencies often
fail to explain their chosen scope of time, and often the scope they do use is
buried deep in the technical modeling within Regulatory Impact Analyses.12
A timeline approach can help agencies facing this sort of decision to be
disciplined in their approach to the question of temporal scope, while
assisting judges, analysts, regulators, and academics in rigorous review of
temporal scope decisions.
Why should regulators limit the temporal scope at all, rather than
incorporating all information from the beginning of time and considering
the possible consequences until the end of time? By identifying some limits to
temporal scope, the regulator makes analyses more tractable and can avoid
computational messes.'3 Yet as the scope becomes more restricted, regulators
risk adopting inefficient policies that impose costs on later periods outside
the relevant period.4 The appropriate temporal scope, therefore, can be a
key input into the regulatory process, and the timeline approach can help
illuminate the stakes of scope selection.'s
2.

Intertemporal Dependence

A timeline approach that represents multiple regulatory decisions along
a single temporal axis can also be a helpful tool for aiding systematic
interrogation of the relationships among different points on the line. In our
view, different stages of regulatory policy should properly be construed as

11. See generally PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL
ANALYSIS (2004) (arguing that a long retrospective temporal scope is desirable because it reveals
the underlying phenomena a regulation is meant to address).
12.

See Rowell, supranote 5, at 1233-37.

Among other decision costs, estimating impacts until the end of time would involve
considerable uncertainty in more distant years, and discounting the costs and benefits in these
distant years to present value would also render many of these distant effects negligible. But see
generally Tyler Cowen, CaringAbout the DistantFuture: Why It Matters and What It Means, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 5 (2007) (advocating for incorporating distant costs and benefits into regulatory
decisions); Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting... on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (2007) (same).
13.

For instance, because the Congressional Budget Office restricts its cost estimates to a
14.
ten-year projection, some commentators have questioned the Affordable Care Act's long-term
viability, even though it was budget neutral as scored by the CBO. See, e.g., ObamaCare'sReal Price
Tag: The Funding Gap Is a Canyon by Year 10, WALL STREETJ. (Aug. 6, 200g, 8:46 AM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB 00014240529702036092045743146220755608go.
For perspectives on how to select a scope, see Eric A. Posner, Agencies Should Ignore
15.
Distant-Future Generations, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 139, 139-40 (2007); Rowell, supra note 5, at
1238-39 (arguing that agencies should at least extend their temporal scopes to the temporal
break-even point).

REREGULA TION AND THE REGULATORY TIMELINE

2016]

1505

related to and dependent upon one another, rather than viewed as a series of
isolated, independent events. We refer to this phenomenon as the
"intertemporal dependence" of regulatory decision-making.
The basic intuition underlying intertemporal dependence is that what
comes before-and is expected to come after-a regulatory decision may have
fundamental implications for how that regulatory decision is structured.
Earlier policies can either inhibit or facilitate future regulatory policies, by
implementing regulatory roadblocks or making regime changes easier. A
regulatory policy that requires significant industry-specific investments by
participants, for example, makes it costly to implement regulatory change that
forces incumbents to abandon their projects.' 6
A numerical example may illustrate how regulatory decisions at different
points on a timeline display intertemporal dependence. Imagine that a
regulator at "Time-Point A" implements a policy that requires the regulated
industry to adopt and operate a particular piece of technology, such as a
pollution monitor on a smokestack. Suppose the cost of the monitoring
technology will be 9 (this could be $9 million, or $90 million, or $goo million,
but we will keep the numbers small to simplify). The decision by an initial
regulator to require the costly technology would thus be cost-justified only if
the social benefits of the monitoring were at least 9 as well. Assume that the
benefits of the technology are expected to be io over the next decade. In that
case, the initial requirement for the technology would be cost-justified.
Imagine that the initial regulator thus adopts the policy.

-

Table 1. Example of the Temporally Interdependent Costs and Benefits of a
Smokestack Monitoring Policy at Three Different Time-Points
Time-Point A

Timie-Point B

Time-Point C

"Initial Regulation"

"Deregulation"
2

"Reregla tion"
4

Costs

9

Benefits

io

1

6

Net Benefits
Is the Policy

+1

-1

+2

Yes

No

Yes

Cost-Justified?

Assume that ten years pass, such that the regulator is now at "Time-Point
B." The regulator at Time-Point B faces a different context for decisionmaking than did the regulator at Time-Point A. The pollution monitor is still
attached to the smokestack, left over from the prior requirement. Industry
practice and norms may have developed with increased monitoring, and
communities around regulated industries may have grown up in part based
on existing industry emissions. The regulator at Time-Point B might
conclude, based on then-current emissions rates and monitoring norms, that
16.

See, e.g., infra Part II.B.i (discussing vestigial effects).
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the benefits of continuing to require the monitoring technology are
significantly reduced-perhaps only i over the next decade. At the same time,
the costs of continuing to require the technology are reduced by the fact that
the industry has already invested in smokestack monitors. Costs are thus no
longer expected to be 9-the estimate incorporating the initial cost of
purchasing technology-but 2, a figure that might represent continued
maintenance and upkeep costs, as well as the now-reduced cost for a
technology that has had increased demand over the prior decade. Under
these circumstances, where expected cost is 2 and expected benefits are i, the
regulator might choose to deregulate, eliminating the requirement for the
smokestack monitors.
Assume that five more years pass. It is now "Time-Point C." The regulator
at Time-Point C faces a different context for decision-making than either
prior regulator. A key factor to note here is that-even without intervening
scientific or technological development-the regulator at Time-Point C has
significantly more information about emissions behaviors than either prior
regulator, because regulator C knows how industry, communities, and the
public behave when a monitor is required and when it is not. No prior
regulator had that information.
With this in mind, it is possible to evaluate the impacts of policies at TimePoints A and B on the expected costs and benefits of readopting a smokestack
monitoring rule at Time-Point C.
Begin with costs. The cost of smokestack monitors is likely to be less than
it was at Time-Point A, not only because of general technological
development, but also because of the direct impacts that policy had on the
availability of parts (in this case, leftover smokestack monitors-some of which
may still even be attached to the smokestacks) and on the market price for
monitoring technologies (by increasing demand for that technology over the
previous ten-year period). Yet costs may be higher than at Time-Point B,
because of the direct impact that the deregulation had on parts availability,
trained personnel availability, and in reducing the total demand for monitors
in the intervening years. As a result, imagine the cost of adopting a
smokestack-monitoring requirement is now 4.
Now consider the impact of prior policies on the expected benefits of
readopting the policy. The deregulator at Time-Point B calculated expected
benefits based upon then-current emissions rates and monitoring norms. But
those estimates of industry behavior were mere projections: the reregulator at
Time-Point C now actually knows how industry behavior developed in
response to deregulation and to other background changing circumstances.
Given the complex interplay of regulatory requirements and industry norms,
the norms may well have shifted and relaxed during deregulation. At the same
time, exogenous factors like rising real estate prices and population growth
may have pushed additional residential settlement nearer to the sources of
the emissions. In addition, scientific progress may now illuminate the benefits
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calculation in ways that were unavailable to prior regulators: research might
now show, for example, that smokestack emissions impact human and
environmental health more than previously thought. As a result, the benefits
of the policy at Time-Point C could well be something like 6. As a result, the
same policy is now cost-justified once more.
This example helps illustrate three observational points. First, the
landscape of costs and benefits faced by regulators at different points on the
timeline were significantly affected by the decisions of regulators earlier on
the timeline. The deregulator at Time-Point B, for example, faced the costs
and benefits it did because of the decision at Time-Point A to regulate.
Without that decision, the regulatory landscape at Time-Point B might well
have been completely different. Ignoring the temporal context of the decision
at Time-Point B thus obscures what could be a critical aspect of the decisionmaking.
Second, and conversely, the regulators at each point on the timeline
significantly affected subsequent regulators. The reregulator at Time-Point C
was affected by both the decision to initially regulate and the decision to
deregulate: without both decisions, the regulator at Time-Point C might also
have faced importantly different costs and benefits. Here again, ignoring the
temporal context of the decision at Time-Point C could lead an analyst to
overlook important and even determinative aspects of regulatory decisionmaking.
Third, and finally, the example shows how the reregulator at Time-Point
C is faced with a meaningfully different decision from the initial regulator at
Time-Point A. A binary approach to the smokestack monitoring policy context
would treat the policy decision at Time-Point A and Time-Point C as if they
were the same: as if they both represented the regulatory status of switching
regulation "on." Yet while regulators at the different time-points would indeed
be considering the same policy-in this case, whether to require smokestack
monitors for this particular industry-they face very different landscapes of
costs and benefits associated with that policy. For regulatory analyses that seek
to understand how and why regulators do and should make decisions,
obscuring these differences is problematic.
Those are descriptive takeaways of the smokestack monitor example. But
the example-and its situation within a timeline approach-also helps
generate prescriptions for regulators.
First, illustrating the changing costs and benefits over time can explain
how regulatory change-even what appears to be regulatory "oscillation"may actually be optimal (and thus socially desirable) under some
circumstances. This point stands in contrast to a common assumption,
bolstered by the lack of temporal context in the binary approach, that

1508
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switching back and forth between the status of "regulated" and "not
regulated" is wasteful, inefficient, or politically suspect.'7
A second and more complex prescription is that the selection of current
policies should be informed by the knowledge that future industry changes
will be affected by current decisions. 8 Regulators routinely account for the
expected impacts of regulation on industry and the public when they perform
Regulatory Impact Analyses.'9 If the decisions of a regulator at any point on a
timeline will also affect subsequent regulators-and thus the industry and
members of the public affected by the regulation-then impacts on future
regulators may sometimes be as relevant to sound policy decisions as
immediate, direct impacts on industry and the public. Similarly, retrospective
analyses should strive to account for the impacts of past regulatory decisions
on the present landscape of policymaking costs and benefits.
This point builds on the phenomenon of path dependence as it has been
explored in social science literatures. Path dependence focuses on explaining
ways in which the set of decisions one faces at a particular point in time is
limited by past decisions. In the words of one prominent researcher, it is the
idea that "'history matters' or that 'the past influences the future.'"o Path
dependence has been broadly applied to a variety of phenomena, including
why institutions and industries evolve as they do,21 why inferior technologies

17.
See Brett McDonnell, Dampening Financial Regulatory Cycles, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1597,
1631-39 (2013) (exploring ways to "dampen" regulatory change while still recognizing that
change can be desirable); see also supra note 2 (citing sources implicitly using the binary
approach). But see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1595 (2005) (arguing for mandatory rollbacks of legislation
passed in response to crises).
18. For a thoughtful argument that regulators should generally seek to regulate by
envisioning the future direction of change over time, see generally DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE
EcoNOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW (2012). While we agree with Driesen that regulatory analysts face
significant opportunities to more thoroughly account for expected future changes, here we
emphasize the impact of the regulator's decision itself as a vector for future changes.
ig. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS: A PRIMER g (201 1), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/
regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf ("[Agencies] should, to the extent
feasible, estimate the monetary value of the benefits and costs of each regulatory alternative
considered. Both benefits and costs are measured by the value that individuals place on the
change resulting from a particular regulatory alternative.").
20. James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, 29 THEORY & SOC'Y 507, 507
(2000) (invoking these common conceptions to motivate formalizing the concept of path
dependence). See generally Tom Ginsburg et al., Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and
Temporary Law, 8 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 291 (2014) (attempting to combat path dependence with law).
21.
E.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 241, 262-63, 284-85 (1996)
(explaining the industrial organization of certain industries in part by invoking historical
happenstance); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE 92-s04 (1990) (emphasizing path dependence's role in shaping the choice of
various institutions).
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are adopted over superior ones, 2 and why social conventions emerge and
persist.23 These explanations often invoke the economic idea of evolutionary
stable equilibria: in a situation where several possible end-games exist,
decisions early in a timeline can irrevocably lead one down a course towards
one single equilibrium, while the costs of reversing that course increase the
further one progresses down such a course. 24
Path dependence is closely related to the causal link stretching from the
past into the present.-s For instance, path dependence has been used to
explain the continued dominance of QWERTY keyboards. 6 Once society has
converged on a particular layout, switching to a new one involves incurring
expenses: typists must learn a new layout, manufacturers must retool their
operations, etc. As long as these switching costs exceed the incremental gains
from moving to a new layout, society will remain stuck in the existing
configuration. Thus, the QWERTY keyboard, as the first to gain traction,
steered society down a course to its present state of almost exclusive QWERTY
usage, despite the existence of arguably superior alternatives.'7
The application of path dependence literature into prospective
regulatory decision-making is complicated by the strategic aspect of public
policy decisions. Because path dependency is invoked to explain how a
current state of affairs was reached, it is primarily backward looking, and relies
on precipitating exogenous happenstance to get started down a particular
path. Regulatory decision-making, however, involves recognizing not just the
historical events that helped determine the state of affairs regulators currently
face-the typical application of path dependence-but also recognizing the
impacts that current actions will have on future regulators. This then feeds
back strategically into informing the action regulators will take today. This
latter attribute extends path dependence by recognizing that regulators'
intentional choices-in addition to the historical happenstance that
facilitated those intentional choices-will interact to impact which future path
regulators choose.
Because regulatory decision-making allows for consideration of multiple
kinds of relationships among the future, present, and past, we think these
intertemporal
relationships
are better
understood
as exhibiting

22.
See, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 332,
332-33 (1985).
23.
See generally Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, g J. EcoN. PERSP. 85 (1989) (discussing
several such examples).

24.

See, e.g., id. at go-92.

25.

Mahoney, supra note 20, at 510.
26.
See generally David, supra note 22. David argues that the continued dominance of the
QWERTY configuration creates a cost for anyone wishing to switch to other configurations. The
existing standard therefore sustains itself as a function of the limits, or costs, imposed by past

decisions to adopt the first-to-market QWERTY keyboard. Id. at 335-36.
27.

Id.
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intertemporal dependence, rather than the more limited and unidirectional
path-dependence (or, for that matter, the temporally decontextualizing
model of a binary switch). A timeline is a helpful tool for visualizing and
systematizing considerations of intertemporal dependence, because it
portrays these multiple decision points along a single axis.
B.

REREGULATIONASA

CATEGORY

Because it showcases the temporal context of regulatory decisions, the
timeline approach can be helpful at any stage in a regulatory process. In this
Subpart, however, we want to focus on a particular stage of regulatory
decision-making-reregulation-as emblematic of the theoretical divergence
between the timeline approach and the binary approach.
Reregulation occurs when a previously deregulated area is regulated
once more. Under a traditional binary model, reregulation looks identical to
initial regulation: both are instances of regulation being "on" rather than
"off." Once a reregulatory decision is situated along a timeline, however, its
intertemporal dependence on related regulatory decisions becomes more
apparent. In particular, we argue here that the timeline approach reveals two
characteristics of reregulation that arise predictably in reregulatory contexts,
and which are obscured under the traditional binary approach. These
characteristics are: the existence of vestigial effects left over from prior
regulatory regimes, and opportunities for learning from prior regimes.
i.

Vestigial Effects

Reregulation does not occur on a blank slate. It arises only where there
have been prior regulatory regimes-regimes that can leave traces behind.
These might include agency-specific effects-such as inherited decision
procedures, internal organizational forms and staffing, leftover agencies, or
data collection or review-and industry-specific effects, as where industry
players or the market changed structure in response to prior regulatory
regimes. Vestiges remaining from earlier points along the regulatory timeline
affect the feasible set of policies that can be implemented at reregulation. In
particular, they can affect the costs and benefits associated with choosing one
policy over another. These are the impacts commonly described in path
dependence literature.
Consider the establishment of internal agency decision-making
hierarchies. Within an agency, particularized decision-making hierarchies
8
may have been established to serve earlier decision-making processes.2
Agency decision-making processes themselves may have been developed to

28. For a very helpful cataloguing of the many ways that internal agency structure can affect
agency decision-making, see generally Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV.
421 (2015).
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serve earlier goals or structures. Changing these existing systems to fit new
regulatory policy may cost more than if no system had been in place.
But existing systems can also facilitate change. Data gathered under a
prior regime may-or may only partially-inform reregulatory decisionmaking. Exploratory or review commissions, possibly established to review
collected data, may never have been abolished. Or deregulation may have
gutted much of an agency's power without dismantling the agency itself,
leaving the agency largely intact and merely awaiting enforcement authority.g9
Outside of an agency, prior regimes may have transformed the market
into a creature that alters the costs and benefits of reregulation relative to
initial regulation. Firms may have been aggregated (directly or by necessity)
by regulatory order, presenting reregulators with powerful industry players
who have sizable industry-specific investments that cannot easily be disrupted
by regulatory change. Or prior regulators could have split up incumbent
firms, a difficult process to unwind that again presents reregulators with a
more limited set of feasible options. Or prior regulators could have prohibited
firms from expanding into particular types of business, affecting the character
of the players and the problems that reregulators will later confront. In all
these instances, the steps taken by prior regulators and deregulators affect the
problems reregulators will face, and the potential options that reregulators
can feasibly implement to solve those problems without imposing undue
costs.
A binary approach to regulation does not easily capture the existence of
or implications from vestigial effects. One could account for some of this
effect by assuming that vestigial costs and benefits make it more or less
difficult to turn the switch from on to off. But later regulators are not locked
into either rolling back or re-imposing former regulation; instead, they can
adopt new policies. Doing so may be particularly attractive because of industry
changes and vestigial effects accumulating over time. And the new policy to
adopt can be usefully informed by opportunities to learn from former
policies, as we discuss.
2.

Opportunities for Learning

Reregulation arises where there is a relatively complex regulatory
timeline. This complexity offers valuable opportunities for learning from
experiences with prior rounds of regulation and deregulation, and for
gathering information about the impacts from these earlier regulatory
regimes. These lessons can be used to inform reregulation, by showing where
certain proposed regulatory approaches might prove ineffective based on past
experience with a similar approach, or by revealing where regulation is not
even necessary based on experience with deregulation.

29.
See, e.g., ROBERT BRITT HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM:
DEREGULATION OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 264 (ig89).
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For example, at the point of reregulation, any regulated industry will
already have experienced initial regulation, deregulation, and possibly
regulatory reform. Each of these prior regimes provides a reregulator with
useful information about potential regulatory strategies. The initial
experience with regulation can give the reregulator insight into the expected
effects that reregulation might have-although some important differences
may arise due to changes in the industry since the time of initial regulation.
This insight can steer the reregulator towards techniques that were effective
and,just as importantly, away from techniques that were ineffective and which
may have led to the perceived need for deregulation.so Likewise, the prior
deregulatory regime can show the reregulator where reregulation is
particularly needed and where it is not, and may hint at the type of
reregulatory intervention that might be necessary.
The prospect of learning from earlier regulatory regimes, while useful
for reregulators at the point of reregulation, may also influence the behavior
of prospectively oriented regulators at prior points in the regulatory timeline.
If regulators are faced with insufficient or uncertain data at the initial point
of regulation, one regulatory approach might structure the initial regulation
to maximize the potential for future learning opportunities, which then could
be used to fine-tune or even completely overhaul the regulation as
appropriate. A timeline approach thus helps to illustrate both that regulators
can adopt new policies, and that their choices today impact their later ability
to regulate.
3.

Distinctiveness of Reregulation

We have used reregulation as an emblem of where a timeline approach
to regulation captures important relationships that may be obscured by a
binary approach to regulation. But neither vestigial effects nor opportunities
for learning-the two characteristics of reregulation on which we have
focused-are unique to reregulation. Each arises to varying degrees at other
stages of the regulatory timeline as well. For instance, the deregulator will
confront vestigial effects from the initial regulation, and she can learn from
the experience with regulation to pinpoint where regulation's protections
have grown sufficiently superfluous to permit deregulation. Even the initial
regulator may face industry custom that renders certain regulatory

30.

For example, several municipalities experimented with taxi deregulation in the 1970s

and i98os. Following perceived failure of the deregulatory policy, many of these municipalities
merely re-implemented the initial regulatory regime. Some, however, learned from
deregulation's failures to implement new regulatory policies that also captured some of the
observed advantages of deregulation. See generally PRICE WATERHOUSE, ANALYSIS OF TAXICAB
DEREGULATION AND RE-REGULATION (1993)
(describing deregulation and subsequent
reregulation of taxicab industry).
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approaches more feasible-or necessary-than others.3 The hallmarks of
reregulation thus differ only in degree, rather than in kind, from the
situations that confront regulators at all phases. This means that the timeline
approach can be helpful even early in a regulation's evolution.
That said, the influence of vestigial effects and of opportunities for
learning tends to grow as one progresses further down the regulatory
timeline. Later reregulatory actions are precipitated by historical attempts at
regulation and deregulation, which tend to leave more vestigial effects in their
wake than were faced by either the regulator or deregulator. In addition, the
later position along the regulatory timeline affords the reregulator with more
empirical evidence for proposed regulations, based on past regulatory
experiences, than was available to the initial regulator or deregulator. But
because these differences are of degree, reregulation may be best understood
as a special case of the characteristics facing regulators, deregulators, and
regulatory reformers.
As suggested by this approach, it can sometimes be difficult to draw sharp
lines between what might qualify as regulation versus reregulation versus
regulatory reform, or even sometimes deregulation. While the extreme points
may be relatively easily classified, some of the middle ground is less clear.
Regardless of specific classifications, however, we believe that lessons from
reregulation can be carried over usefully into every stage on a regulatory
timeline.
III. USES FOR REGULATORY TIMELINES

This Part identifies two uses of regulatory timelines for regulators and for
regulatory observers. First, it describes ways that regulators can alter the
apparent costs and benefits of current policies by manipulating the temporal
scope of a policy analysis. Second, it identifies ways that regulators can utilize
the intertemporal dependence of regulatory decisions to alter the landscape
of costs and benefits faced by future policymakers.
A.

USING TEMPORAL SCOPE

Costs and benefits from regulatory policies are felt over time. To compare
policies whose costs and benefits have different points of incidence, regulators
properly discount the values to present values.32 Yet regulators rarely explicitly

Custom can be a powerful influence on both intra-industry interactions as well as
31.
interpersonal interactions, affecting the need for and effectiveness of regulation. See, e.g., ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (examining the

role of custom in influencing neighborly interactions); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industy, 21

J.

LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992)

(studying custom in the diamond industry).
32.
See e.g. generally Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On DiscountingRegulatoryBenefits: Risk,
Money, and IntergenerationalEquity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171 (2007); see alsoArden Rowell, The Cost
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address the reasons for their selection of one time horizon over another, and
do not consistently use the same time horizon for all policies.ss For example,
selected periods for determining the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste disposal
project's costs and benefits varied from to,ooo to i million years, while
relevant temporal scopes for the Paperwork Reduction Act and for measuring
the social cost of carbon are 3 and 300 years, respectively.34
Choosing a temporal end-point for an analysis implicitly treats all impacts
after that point as if they have a value of zero.35 The choice of temporal scope
can thus sometimes determine which policies look desirable, and which do
not. To see this point, consider three competing policies-A, B, and Cwhose discounted benefits and costs are the following:
Table

2.

Example of How Strategic Shifting of Temporal Scope Affects the
Substance of Policy Costs and Benefits

TmPoiyAPoliy
Costs

ffi
Benefits

C~
Benefits

Polc

Period
1

Costs

Benefits

Costs

1

3

3

1

1

2

2

4

0

2

2

2

3

7

o

I1

3
5

,3

12

3

6

9

3

Total

6

7

With these intertemporal distributions of costs and benefits, the selection
of time scope will determine which of these three policies appears to be costjustified-and thus, in many cases, which policy is ultimately selected by
regulators.
Note that the "totals" shown are the total impacts over the entire time
period. If all time periods 1, 2, and 3 are incorporated into the analysis, Policy
A would fail a cost-benefit test, because it results in more costs than benefits.
Policies B and C would both pass, because they result in more benefits than
cost for the selected time scale. Furthermore, over the same three-period

of Time: HaphazardDiscountingand the UndervaluationoflRgulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1505, 1515-17 (2010) (describing how failing to discount undermines intertemporal comparisons).

33. See Rowell, supra note 5, at 1230-38.
34. Control of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel
Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 23,413, 23,622 (Apr. 28, 2014) (tobe codified at 4 o C.F.R pts. 79, 80, 85, 86,
6oo, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1042, 1048, 1054, io65, io66); ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY ET AL., TECHNicAL
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGUIATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: UNDER EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12866, at 25 (2010), https://www3.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf. Seegenerally

Rowell, supranote 5 (describing the time scopes used in various cost-benefit analyses).
35. See Rowell, supra note 5, at 1232 ("When a period of time is omitted from a cost-benefit
analysis, it is like valuing all costs and benefits after that period at zero dollars. The selection of
the relevant 'end point' for an analysis thus affects the monetization of costs and benefits," while
conceding that "[t]he selection of the end point will not always matter to the final analysis,
especially where many of the benefits are in the far-distant future.").
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scope, Policy B is preferable to Policy C on cost-efficiency grounds: it costs the
same amount (6), but yields significantly more benefits (g instead of 7).
Now consider what happens to the comparative desirability of the policies
with shorter time scopes. If the temporal endpoint is set at time period 2,
Policy A still fails a cost-benefit test (5 cost is greater than 3 benefit). But so
does Policy B-the most desirable policy under a three-period scope! With
this time scope, only Policy C would appear to yield greater benefits than costs
(as it yields 4 benefits versus 3 costs).
Finally, consider a temporal endpoint at time period 1. With this short
scope, Policy A actually appears to be cost-benefitjustified (3 versus 1), while
neither Policy B norPolicy C passes a cost-benefit test (1 versus 3 and i versus
2). Strikingly, this is true despite the fact that, over all three time periods,
policies B and C are the only cost-justified policies.
This example illustrates that the choice of endpoint may be
determinative of which policies pass a cost-benefit test, as well as which policy
appears most cost-effective. In general, having to choose an endpoint for the
temporal scope means that adopted policies will be biased towards those
where discounted costs are relatively backloaded and discounted benefits are
relatively frontloaded.36 Regulators who are aware of the impact of scope
selection could intentionally set the endpoint to justify adopting a preferred
policy, even if that policy is not cost-justified or cost-efficient over the long
term. Thus regulators can use temporal scope deliberately to change the
apparent impacts of a proposed policy. Importantly, however, temporal scope
impacts analyses even when it is not selected either reflectively or strategically:
for practical and prudential reasons, regulators must typically choose some
endpoint,37 and any selected endpoint will tend to shift the suite of policies
that appear to be cost-justified.
B.

USING INTERTEMPORAL DEPENDENCE

The ability to determine the temporal scope over which discounted costs
and benefits are analyzed is not the only way that regulators can influenceunintentionally or strategically-future regulatory policy choice. As we have

36.

The impact of discounting is such that regulatory impacts in the distant future-

whether those impacts are costs or benefits-look relatively small in today's dollars. See, e.g.,
Rowell, supra note 32, at 1510-17 (discussing the regulatory practice of discounting future costs
and benefits); David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change andDiscounting the Future: A
Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 433 (2oog). See generally Posner, supra note 15
(arguing that the impact of discounting on future impacts is so great that agencies should simply

ignore distant-future generations). Selection of endpoints is not the only area where impartial
regulatory decision-making biases results over time. See Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference
Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatoiy Law, g TEX. L. REV. 625, 669-79 (2015)

(finding that asymmetric incentives to appeal agency decisions and deferential review of those
appeals will systematically bias regulatory policy in favor of regulated players).
37.

For an argument that agencies should at least perform temporal breakeven analysis in

scoping their analyses, see Rowell, supranote 5, at

1238-39.
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argued, decisions along a regulatory timeline can affect the costs and benefits
of other decisions on that timeline. One implication is that the connection
can be used strategically to impact the relative appeal, and even availability,
of future regulatory decision sets. By imposing vestigial effects on future policy
changes, actions taken by the initial regulator can make later sets-for
example, at the deregulation, regulatory reform, or reregulation stagescomparatively more or less likely to be implemented. This may be because
there is less organized pressure for regulatory change, as when a regulator
fragments industry players into smaller heterogeneous entities that face
coordination difficulties38 But it also may be because these later actions are
now more costly to undertake and therefore are less likely to provide net
benefits.39
For example, suppose an agency must choose between Policies A and B
in period i and Policies Y and Z in later period 2. Taken individually, Policies
A and Y each have expected net benefits of 2 in their relevant periods, while
Policies B and Z each have net benefits of i. If Policy A is chosen in period 1,
however, it imposes costs of 3 on Policy Yin period 2, while Policy B imposes
costs of 3 on Policy Z. In this situation, the choice in period i between Policy
A versus B-both cost-justified and thus available under traditional
cost-benefit review-constrains future regulators by completely determining
the policy that will be adopted in period 2 (Z and Y, respectively). The
situation is depicted in Figure 2 below. Similarly, one can visualize a situation
where Policy A imposes benefits of 3 on Policy Z in period 2, greatly increasing
the chance that Z will be chosen over Y at the appropriate time and
conceivably expanding regulators' options in future periods.

See, e.g., Michael E. Levine, Essay, Why Weren't the Airlines Reregulated, 23 YALEJ. ON REG.
38.
269, 280-83 (2oo6) (arguing that induced heterogeneity deterred regulatory change in the
airline industry).
39. Not only will new policies that provide relatively fewer benefits (or even impose net
costs) be less politically attractive than a policy producing more welfare on balance, but also the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") requires agencies to perform a costbenefit analysis before instituting new regulatory policies, with the goal of instituting regulatory
change that maximizes total welfare.
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Now consider the manner in which these costs and benefits can be
introduced. Vestigial effects can impose costs on regulatory change by directly
increasing the cost of undertaking new policies. For instance, a deregulatory
policy that completely dismantles the prior regulatory agency directly
increases the cost of reregulation, because the regulatory agency must be set
up again, authority must be (re)allocated, new data must be collected, etc.
More commonly, however, vestigial effects introduce costs indirectly, such as
through regulators' perceived need to compensate incumbent industry actors
for their reliance interests. Regulatory change disrupts this reliance, leading
most changes to apply only prospectively or to compensate incumbents for
their disrupted expectations (or both).4o
Compensation is generally provided to protect incumbents' reliance interests. For
40.
example, energy regulators typically allow power producers to recoup the cost of their
investments, even during deregulation. These costs are known in the industry as "stranded costs."
Cf Peter Molk, The Ownership ofHealth Insurers, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (applying this
approach to minimize costs of future regulatory change); Peter Molk, The Puzzling Lack of
Cooperatives, 88 TUL. L. REV. 899, 951-52 (2014) (discussing the differential vestigial impacts
from different subsidy approaches). Within the last 25 years, Louis Kaplow and others have
argued that in many cases, optimal regulatory policy would not compensate incumbents for their
reliance and should impose requirements retroactively. See generally Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986). Failure to compensate or to apply
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The cost of this compensation, or the decreased effectiveness from
applying policy changes only prospectively, is then properly factored into the
cost-benefit analysis of regulatory change. Both these costs and the direct
costs discussed above can be controlled to some degree. A legislator might
decide whether to completely dismantle an agency as part of deregulatory
change, for example, which would raise the costs of reregulating. Or a
regulator might decide to require industry players to meet a minimum
production or asset threshold to do business,4 which may raise the costs of
deregulating by inflating the compensation that would be required and by
producing a comparatively small number of industry players who can easily
mobilize to resist regulatory change.
Regulatory policies need not just impose costs on later parties seeking
regulatory change. Regulators can also facilitate future regulatory change by
laying the groundwork for it upfront. Or in other words, the impact of vestigial
effects can be used either to bind or to strengthen the hands of future
regulators. For instance, a regulator might, as part of new regulatory policy,
institute new requirements on incumbent actors that make them more
competitive, making future deregulation easier.42
changes only prospectively, however, makes it difficult to effect regulatory change where the
public or legislators do not vigorously clamor for it, because a failure to compensate is remarkably
effective at mobilizing incumbent industry players against change. Compensation may also be
appropriate when industry players cannot transfer the risk of regulatory change to private
insurance companies, as is often the case. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ,
INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 169 (6th ed. 2015) (providing an
example of homeowners' insurance policy exclusions for costs of legal change); Kaplow, supra, at
536-50. And when incumbent industry players cannot accurately predict regulatory changeperhaps because regulators are in turn trying to accommodate industry players' predictions-the
general case against compensation weakens. See generallyMatthew D. Adler, Legal Transitions:Some
Welfarist Remarks, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 5 (2003).
This has been the result for several cities' taxi regulation, for example, where prospective
41.
market participants face substantial buy-in requirements. In New York City, the cost of entering the

taxi business exceeds $1 million. Chris Isidore, New York City's Yellow Cab Crisis, CNN MONEY (July
22, 2015, 10:58 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/o7/21/Dews/companies/nyc-yellow-taxiuber. For the effects this entry requirement has had on the industry, see Matt Flegenheimer, $1
Million Medallions Stifling the Dreams of Cabdrivers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.

nytimes.com/203/11/15/nyregion/i-million-medallions-stifling-the-dreams-of-cabdrivers.html.
High taxi license costs are not unique to New York City. See, e.g., S.F., CAL. TRANSPORTATION CODE

§ sI16(e) (2015) (fixing San Francisco medallions at $250,006); Thomas Farragher &Jonathan
Saltzman, Amid CriminalProbe, Taxi Owner Looks to Sell: Would Transfer200 ofFleet'sMedallions; Police
Commissioner Opposed, Bos. GLOBE (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/

2013/09/15/amid-probe-taxi-owner-edward-tutunjian-looks-sell/2mJZ6BtCuLhTElWyQbcYBM/
story.html (referring to $6oo,ooo medallions in Boston). Likewise, high entry costs that constrain
future regulation are not unique to the United States. Emma Bi & Sheridan Prasso, Investors Turn
Hong Kong's Red Taxis into New Bubble Market, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 6, 2013, 1:26 AM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/201 3-o8-05/investors-turn-hong-kong-s-red-taxis-into-latest-bubble-

market.html (reporting a recent license sale of $987,600 in Hong Kong).
42. This is essentially what California electricity reregulators have done, entering into tens of
billions of long-term power supply contracts that encouraged construction of new generators. See
Paul L.Joskow, Calfornia'sElectricity Crsi*s 17 OXFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y 365, 386-87 (2001); Frank
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What practical implications for regulatory policy are created by
regulators' ability to impose benefits or costs on subsequent regulators? There
are at least two stories to tell: one where regulators take advantage of this
control to facilitate socially desirable policy, and one where regulators abuse
this control to entrench their policy of choice.
In the happy version of the story, a regulator might wisely choose to bind
the hands of future regulators by implementing a policy with positive
expected benefits that would otherwise face a high likelihood of reversal
before those benefits can be realized. Such might be the case, for example,
with a policy that imposes costs today but which will yield significant benefits
in the future. These policies tend to be politically unpopular and face
relatively high chances of being unwound, even if they are the welfaremaximizing policy, because of the focus that tends to be placed on current
costs.43 In these instances, making the chosen regulatory policy stickier by

raising the costs of switching to another approach could increase the
regulation's effectiveness and increase net social welfare over time.44
Imposing costs could also help a regulator manage shortcomings in her
own ability by committing to a chosen course of action. Lee Fennell and
others have shown how failings of willpower-roughly, one's ability to stick to
a predetermined course of action-and legal policy can interact to improve

A. Wolak, Designing a Competitive Wholesale Electricity MarketThat Benefits Consumers 4 9 (Oct. 15,
2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://web.stanford.edu/group/fwolak/cgi-bin/sites/default/
files/files/Designing%20a%2oCompetitive%2oWholesale%2oElectricity%2oMarket%2oThat%
2oBenefits%2oConsumersOct%202001Wolak.pdf. Long-term contracting is an essential first
step towards effective deregulation, because it obligates generators to run and leads to
competitive spot-price markets. SeeWolak, supra, at 31-32.

&

43. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 56-57 (2013)
(discussing how there may be little popular or political will to maintain these types of policies).
The focus on short-term costs to the exclusion of long-term benefits is driven by several behavioral
phenomena, particularly the disproportionate effect that salient factors (such as costs today) have
on decision-making. See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical
Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 360-62 (2002) (summarizing evidence of so-called
"hyperbolic discounting," whereby people place a high premium on immediate impacts, and
apply a steeply declining discount rate thereafter). See generallyChristinejolls, Cass R. Sunstein
Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1519 (1998)
(discussing the effect of the availability heuristic on decision-making).
44. Or at least it would raise society's expected social welfare. Because future states of the
world are uncertain, and the regulation may be more effective in some states than others, it may
be that future developments are such that society winds up in a state where the regulation is
ineffective-or even destructive. In that case, the costs that were imposed upon the regulation's
adoption have the undesirable consequence that they can keep the regulatory policy from being
changed, even when it would improve social welfare to do so. This point argues in favor of
keeping regulatory policy as flexible and open to later change as feasible, although it is in tension
with political realities that may seek to unwind desirable regulation for ideological reasons if the
cost of doing so is low, and it also could result in unstable and unpredictable regulatory policy
over time, an outcome some commentators disfavor, and which we discuss below. See infra Part
IV.C (emphasizing the benefits of stable regulatory policy).
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or hinder social welfare.45 There is little reason to think that willpower failings
will be wholly absent from regulatory decision-making, which after all is built
on the actions of individuals and can face pressure from legislators, regulated
entities, and the public. By imposing vestigial effects that arise with policy
change, regulators can credibly tie their future hands, decreasing the chance
that later failings in willpower will lead to undoing desirable policies.
Of course, there is no guarantee that regulators will wield their power to
entrench only optimal policies that maximize social well being. Strategic use
of vestigial effects could just as easily be used to cement undesirable policies
that further the regulator's personal agenda or policies that the regulator
mistakenly but honestly believes will maximize society's well being.
Regardless of the desirability or undesirability of intentional
manipulation of regulatory vestigial effects, the decision of whether to do so
is one that must be made at each stage of regulatory decision-making.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that regulators are already making
these decisions, whether subconsciously or intentionally. One practical
prescription would therefore be for agencies to incorporate explicit
discussion of vestigial effects and learning opportunities into their costbenefit analyses and Regulatory Impact Analyses, and for regulatory observers
and oversight to demand such analyses.
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR TIMELINES

The previous Part identified ways that regulators can use timelines to
change the apparent costs and benefits of current policies, and to change the
landscapes of costs and benefits faced by future regulators. These strategies
are potent regulatory tools-tools that can be obscured by the traditional
focus on binary models of regulation, which neglect the temporal context of
regulatory decision-making. One of the primary goals of this Article is to make
these tools transparent to regulatory observers as well as to regulators.
Temporal line drawing can be extraordinarily difficult to perform in a
principled manner4 6-and of course, regulators may not always be perfectly
incentivized to develop highly principled forms of intertemporal analysis.
Nevertheless, principled consideration and interrogation of regulatory
policies on temporal scope setting and time orientation may help regulators
develop (more) ethical, defensible, and appropriate strategies for managing
these issues.
None of these functions is possible so long as temporal scope and
intertemporal dependence remain obfuscated, either by existing regulatory

45. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371
willpower, legal policy, and the particular case of tax policy).

(2011)

(examining

46. For a discussion of the physical and social difficulties created by temporal line-drawing,
and a recognition of the problems this creates for regulatory cost-benefit analysis in particular,
see generally Rowell, supranote 5.

2016]

REREGULATIONAND THE REGULATORY TIMELINE

1521

practice or by unilateral emphasis on binary models of regulation. In this Part,
then, our primary purpose is to describe how regulators and regulatory
observers could explicitly incorporate the timeline approach to analyze the
impacts of their policy decisions on the portrayal of policy costs and benefits,
and on the landscape of future costs and benefits for future policies. Drawing
particularly on option theory, we present a spectrum of possible qualitative
and quantitative analytical approaches.
in general, we argue that regulatory decision-making can be
conceptualized as holding a valuable "regulatory asset" and a corresponding
put option on that asset that enables regulators to "sell" the policy if it
ultimately proves undesirable. The put option represents the value of
adopting flexible regulation that allows one to switch from one policy to
another. Traditional approaches that view regulation as a binary switch to be
turned on and off imply either that each policy has the same degree of
flexibility, or else that flexibility is unimportant. But as the timeline approach
makes clear, some policies can be rolled back or altered more easily than
others, as different policies will impose varying degrees of vestigial effects.
This flexibility, or cost of changing policy down the road, should be factored
into the initial policy choice, because what the future world will look likeand how regulatory policies will interact with it-is inherently variable.
To motivate the importance of accounting for flexibility, we compare
such an approach to current regulatory cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") and
attempt to refine lessons for other decision-making procedures as well.47
Under common practices in regulatory CBA, regulators are encouraged to
choose a policy only when its own expected benefitsjustify its expected costs.48
That said, there is no norm for systematic accounting for the costs and
benefits the policy imposes on future action or the value from learning
opportunities.
We hope that the prior discussion has suggested why this approach is
incomplete. Cost-benefit analyses that fail to account for the impact of
current regulatory decisions on the suite of future regulatory decisions may
well remain blind to the impact of temporal scope and intertemporal
dependence, and may needlessly forgo reflective consideration of likely
vestigial effects and opportunities for learning. This can make it difficult, if
not impossible, to know the optimal longevity of a policy, and to know how

47. Using CBA to inform regulatory decision-making has been facilitated by OIRA's
executive review process, which increasingly requires agencies to justify their chosen policy by
showing that its benefits exceed its costs. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of
Information and Regulatosy Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARv. L. REv. 1838 (2013).
48. For the general requirement that agencies perform a cost-benefit analysis prior to
promulgating significant rules, see Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 F.R. 51735 (1993), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 at 88 (2012); Exec. Order 13,563, 76 F.R. 3821 (2011), repTinted in 5 U.S.C. § 6oi
at 102 (2012). For discussion on the process of cost-benefit analysis, see Rowell, supra note 5, at
1218-21.
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many resources-or foregone benefits-to invest in maintaining flexibility
down the road.
Suppose that regulators, regulatory observers, and regulatory oversight
bodies (such as the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs) were
convinced that it would be valuable to place their cost-benefit analyses in
temporal context. How might they go about operationalizing such an analysis?
We believe that financial option theory can be helpful in teasing apart the
ways in which current policy choices may relate to future policy choices.
Accordingly, below, we introduce basics of financial option theory and
indicate how the flexibility value of regulatory policy can be derived from
traditional financial options.
A.

INSIGHTS FROM OPTION THEORY

Financial options give the holder the right, but not the requirement, to
buy (with a call option) or sell (with a put option) an asset at a specified price
before a specified date.49 We focus on put options here. Put options' value
increases as the spread grows between the underlying asset's value and the
specified price at which the asset can be sold. Thus, a put option's value is
positively related to three factors: (i) the volatility in the underlying asset's
price; (2) the exercise price at which the underlying asset can be sold; and
(3) the length of time-or expiration date-over which the option can be
exercised.so When an individual holds both the underlying asset and a put
option on that asset, she has capped her downside risk of a financial loss at
the option's exercise price while remaining positioned to capture any upside
in asset appreciation. No matter how poorly the underlying asset performs,
the individual can always cut her losses by exercising the put option and
getting out at the exercise price. If the asset performs well, she never exercises
the option but continues to hold the appreciating underlying asset.
Consider how adopting a regulatory policy is similar to holding a valuable
asset plus a put option on that asset.5 1 Regulatory policy is not static; indeed,

For a detailed discussion of options, see generally JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES,
49.
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (8th ed. 2012).
50. The Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to Myron Scholes and Robert Merton for
the initial formalization of this relationship. See, e.g., Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing
of Options and CorporateLiabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (deriving the relationship); Robert
C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCl. 141 (1973) (same).
More variability in the underlying asset price increases the likelihood of a large spread emerging
between the exercise and asset price. A greater exercise price raises the gross proceeds earned by

exercising the option. And a longer exercise period increases the likelihood of a profitable gap
between asset and exercise price.

51. Other scholars have applied this real options approach-which differs from financial
options only in that it considers "real" underlying assets, such as the decision to open a new
production plant, instead of financial options where the underlying asset is a financial security.
See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore, PatienceIs an Economic Virtue: Real Options, NaturalResources, and

Offshore Oil, 8 4 U. COLO. L. REV. 5 81, 587 (2013) (collecting examples and applying real options
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as the earlier examples (and common sense) suggest, regulatory policy can
change over time through revisions, rollbacks, and new approaches. In a
sense, the existing regulatory policy can always be "sold" later, by altering,
scaling back, or augmenting it in ways identified by future learning
opportunities. In this way, the regulator effectively holds a put option on the
underlying regulatory policy asset. If the regulatory policy (the underlying
asset) turns out to be undesirable, the ability to "sell" it and switch to another
approach (the put option) becomes attractive5z This ability to alter course
caps the downside risk associated with any particular regulatory policy.
Conversely, as the regulatory policy becomes more effective, the value of the
regulation increases but the value of the option decreases, as change becomes
less necessary.
To see this, suppose that regulators identify two alternative policies with
different suites of expected costs and benefits. One policy is expected to
produce $500 million in benefits half of the time and $o the rest ("variable
policy"). The competing policy is expected to produce a guaranteed $300
million in benefits in all future states of the world ("guaranteed policy").ss
Failing to account for future periods of policymaking might lead the regulator
to choose the guaranteed policy over the variable policy, because the variable
policy's expected benefit, $250 million, is less than the guaranteed policy's
$300 million expected benefits. Yet such a choice neglects the put option
value, or the value of being able to switch policies if the variable policy (after
opportunity for learning) appears to be creating $o in benefits. As a result,
the "obvious" appeal of the guaranteed policy may lead agencies to forgo real
societal benefits over a world where the regulator selects the variable policy,
keeps it in effect if it proves successful, and switches in those states of the world
where the variable policy produces $o benefit.
Of course, such a switch will not generally be costless, so it is unlikely that
the regulator will net the full $300 million of benefits from the guaranteed
policy upon switching course. Indeed, a motivating force behind our study of

theory to nonrenewable natural resource extraction). See generallyIAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE
STRucruRE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005) (applying option theory to a variety of liability rules).
In the regulatory sphere, often the real option is modeled as a decision to act or to wait for
additional information, rather than, as here, the generalized case of choices among differing
policies. See, e.g., id.; Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399 (2005)
(applying financial options theory to property rights); Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang,
The Unexpected Value ofLitigation:A Real OptionsPerspective,58 STAN. L. REv. 1267 (2oo6) (applying
real options analysis to decision to continue or abandon litigation). In comprehensive work that
makes comparisons to financial options, Professor Alex Lee has argued how option theory can
improve regulations both when options are granted to regulated entities to choose to avoid
particular regulations and when regulators recognize that undesirable regulation can be
abandoned. Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Essay, An Options Approach to Agency Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV.
881, 886-88, 9o8-o (2013) (discussing the case of call options).
Cf Lee, supra note 51, at 90 4 -05 (comparing regulatory policy to call options).
52.
53. See id. at 903-20 (discussing similar examples).
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the term "reregulation" has been to show that such switches are not costless,
because they impose vestigial effects on subsequent decisions. Yet unless the
switch incurs $200 million in costs, including lost regulatory effectiveness
from first trying another policy, initially adopting the variable policy is the
choice that most benefits society.54 To see why, notice that the expected

benefits from the variable policy, properly including the value of the put
option, rise to $400 million minus o.5q, where qrepresents the switching cost.
This is because half the time the benefits will be $500 million, and half the
time they will be $300 million minus q. In this example, the value of the put
option, or the ability to switch course, equals the difference between this
amount and the expected benefits from adopting exclusively the variable
policy, or $150 million minus 0-5q.
In the general case, the value of the regulatory put option will have
determinants similar to a financial put option. The variance of a policy's
expected outcomes across future world-states-such as from regulated
industry's proclivity for change, or a policy's disparate effectiveness across
different economic conditions-is analogous to volatility in a financial
option's underlying asset price. Flexibility, and hence put options, becomes
more valuable when there is a meaningful probability that the regulation will
later prove ineffective or undesirable, which depends critically on there being
uncertainty.55 The "pace" of this variance-whether it occurs early in the
regulatory timeline-functions similarly to a financial option's expiration
date. A faster pace, with high variance in outcomes early on, increases the
probability that a regulatory option will be "in the money" and raises the
option's value, as do later expiration dates with a financial option. And the
difference between a next-best policy's expected value and the first-best
policy's expected value, net of regulatory change costs, functions for a
regulatory option like the difference between the initial asset price and the
exercise price of a financial put option.5 6 Higher costs of regulatory change
drive a wider wedge between the existing and next-best alternative, making it

54.

This assumes risk neutrality on the part of the regulator. It is also possible, however, that

regulators are risk-averse, because they personally value job security that could be risked if
negative world-states are realized, and/or because principles of intergenerational fairness may

militate against undertaking policies with meaningful downside risk.
Therefore, less uncertainty about the future or lower variation in the outcome under
55.
uncertain future events will reduce the attraction of policies that promote flexibility. See Brian
Galle, In PraiseofEx Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REv. 1715, 1759 (2015) (applying this argument
in favor of "ex ante" regulation because of a popular misconception that overstates the
uncertainty of future valuation).
56.
For regulatory option purposes, the next-best policy would be the one with the highest
expected benefits in those states of the world in which it would be adopted, roughly coinciding

with those states where the first-best policy fails. This need not be the same as the policy with the
second-most overall expected benefits, if that policy would rarely be exercised (for instance, if
that second-most policy performs best in only the same states of the world in which the first-best
policy does).
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less likely the option will be exercised, just as larger initial differences between
exercise price and asset price reduce the value of the option. This relationship
is summarized in Table 3 below.
Table 3. Relationship of Regulatory Option Type and Option Price
FinancAI Put Option

Regulatory OptionE

Effect of Incse
Ince
Price
Option
on of

Asset variance
Assetvanance

expected
Variance in regulation's
value

Increase
Ices

Expiration date

Increase

Difference between
asset and exercise
price

"Pace" of variance in regulation's
expected value
Difference between first- and
second-best policy expected
values; Cost of changing policy

Asset price

Regulation's expected value

B.

Decrease
Decrease

INCORPORATING FLEXiBILITY INTO DECISION-MAKING

If regulatory option value is an important component of regulatory
decision-making, but regulators do not systematically account for it, what
should be done? We make four proposals, in increasing order of
sophistication and cost. All four methods could be useful both to regulators
performing Regulatory Impact Analyses, and to regulatory observers
evaluating regulatory analyses.
1.

Follow Simple Rules of Thumb

The easiest and simplest strategy that regulators might use to incorporate
flexibility value into their decision-making is for them to follow simple rules
of thumb that capture the essential attributes of flexible policies and option
theory. Although this is a relatively simple approach, it is also an approach
that comes with potential misfires, and thus regulators should be particularly
cautious about using it in high-stakes contexts.
What heuristics might regulators use to capture the essence of regulatory
put option pricing? First, all else equal, and where the purpose of a regulation
is to secure the most social welfare (and where additional concerns, such as
distributional fairness, do not bar the strategy), regulators might choose the
policy with greatervariancein expected outcomes. This is because future regulatory
(and exogenous) change can step in and buttress negative states of the world,
raising the overall expected benefits. This rule of thumb may run directly
counter to the first instincts of many regulators, whose risk aversion may drive
them towards choosing a policy that provides stable, reliable benefits in all
future states of the world. Again borrowing from financial theory, such riskaverse regulators are in effect choosing the reputable blue chip stock (a single
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policy) with reliable but low expected returns, rather than building a portfolio
from two or more uncorrelated stocks (an adopted policy with one or more
contingent possibilities depending on future realized states of the world) with
both higher expected returns and lower overall risk.
A second rule of thumb would be to adopt the moreflexible policy with lower
switching costs, all else equal. Greater flexibility facilitates changing future
regulatory course, which is particularly valuable when existing policies later
prove less effective than originally hoped.
Both of these rules of thumb may raise objections because each requires
a determination that "all else is equal" among policies, and realistically
regulators may rarely know when that is the case. Therefore, we offer a final
rule of thumb in the form of a default rule: avoid regulatory policies with high
switching costs-particularly those with switching costs so high as to render
them permanent as a practical matter. This amounts essentially to an antiirreversibility assumption for regulatory policy.
Employing these rules of thumb would mean that regulators' decisions
would incorporate some of the insights from option analysis. These guidelines
could easily be integrated into regulatory decision-making practices with little
or no difficulty. Rules of thumb, however, inevitably miss some of the finer
nuances that could lead to more tailored decision-making. For the slightly
more ambitious regulator, or for policies with larger stakes, we present a
second option that is somewhat more difficult to implement but that captures
more of the important implications of option pricing and the value of
flexibility.
2.

Perform Qualitative Ordinal Analysis

Our second recommendation is for regulators to first ordinally rank
potential policies along several factors that capture much of the option
pricing insights. We recommend that regulators rank policies along the
following specific dimensions: overall expected benefit (from high to low);
variability of the expected benefits (from high to low); and flexibility, or ease
of switching to a competing policy (from most to least). These ordinal
rankings capture much of the insight offered by option analysis. After
developing these ordinal rankings, regulators would then make tradeoffs
across the different lists to arrive at an ultimate decision.
Regulators often already compose ordinal rankings along the overall
expected benefit dimension and typically choose the policy that tops that list,
or else choose from among the policies that are cost-benefit justified. Yet in
many circumstances, that policy will not be optimal.57 Regulators will
frequently find that the policy topping the expected benefit ranking may

Regulators could be assured that the highest expected value policy is also the optimal
57.
policy only when that policy promises the most net benefits in every possible future state of the
world.
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come in much lower along the variability of expected benefits or the flexibility
dimensions, and in that case the competing policies deserve close attention
before being dismissed. A competing policy with high variance in expected
benefits could reasonably be chosen over the policy that ranks highest in
expected benefits with low variability in those benefits, if the competing policy
could be rolled back in favor of another when it performs poorly. Ranking
policies along these dimensions will prove to be a very useful exercise for
regulators. It also presents a more realistic scenario than a recommendation
based purely on rules of thumb, because decision-making in the real world
rarely has "everything else equal" scenarios, but rather presents the type of
difficult tradeoffs illustrated in an ordinal ranking.
These first two approaches, qualitative in nature, capture many of the
benefits from quantitative option analysis without requiring regulators to
undertake rigorous numerical analysis. Their virtue is their ability to improve
regulatory decision-making beyond current practices while being easy to
implement. Explicitly requiring regulators to think about the value of
flexibility, even in this qualitative manner, should lead them to better
incorporate this value into their decision-making.s 8 Qualitative approaches do
not tell regulators how to make tradeoffs between expected benefits and other
factors, however. For those looking for additional guidance on how to trade
off quantified benefits like expected values and unquantified ones such as the
value of flexibility, we present two additional options.
3.

Use Full Decision Trees

Still more of the value of flexibility could be captured if regulators
developed complete decision trees. These decision trees would extend the
decisions past the present and into the future, capturing the options that
regulators have to later alter policy. Backwards induction from distant points
on these trees would then yield the appropriate policy to be followed.
Figure 3 illustrates a simplified CBA process, which is broadly
representative of modern practices in regulatory decision-making. Regulators
concentrate on the immediate decision, assuming it remains in place in the
future-implicitly assuming that the selected policy should be modeled as a
switch that can be toggled only once. Resultant decision trees have one

58. There is empirical evidence for the effectiveness of this type of approach, particularly if
it is combined with disclosure requirements. Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires
managers and auditors to provide a narrative statement assessing the adequacy of the company's
internal controls on financial reporting. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 404(a) (t), 116 Stat. 745, 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (a) (1) (2012)). Evidence suggests
the narratives have led management to adopt more effective internal controls, which could be
because the exercises lead them to internalize the value of internal controls as well as enact
change so that the resultant narrative statements are more palatable when disclosed. Robert
Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 40 4 , 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703,
717-20 (2007) (collecting this evidence).
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substantive policy node: the choice between the contemplated policy (or
policies) and a competing policy (which could be to stay with the status quo).
Figure 4 shows a full decision tree of the type we contemplate based on a
timeline, which extends policy choices past the present by including the
option to switch regulatory policies at later stages. Drawing an extended
decision tree allows regulators to capture the flexibility of regulatory policy.
By incorporating the ability to change course in those states of the world
where an adopted policy proves problematic, the sophisticated regulator
arrives at the regulatory policy choice that might be expected to improve
overall social welfare.
Figure 3: Simplified CBA Process
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As is readily apparent, designing such a decision tree can quickly spiral
into a herculean task as the possible states of the world increase at each node
and as the number of future nodes grows. The complexity grows even more
quickly as regulators consider multiple policy alternatives. A decision tree,
then, is a higher-cost analytical option, where the cost increases with multiple
policy options and policy longevity. That said, the approach captures a
significant portion of the insights of option theory, and the analytical cost may
be worthwhile where the policy stakes are relatively higher.
4.

Price the Regulatory Option

Finally, and most complicatedly, regulators (or regulatory observers)
could develop and use a formal option pricing model to explicitly value a
policy's flexibility-a model that, while burdensome, has had a revolutionary
effect on the financial industry.59 Armed with option prices plus the expected
benefits from regulatory policies, regulators would have a better chance of
maximizing the joint expected value of the underlying regulation and the
value of the regulatory option, rather than maximizing exclusively the
regulation's expected value, as they do under existing practices.
Implementing such a model in practice may be easier than it might first
appear. Although a formal model must first be developed, analogous models
in financial and real option theory provide valuable starting points.
Additionally, such a model will require knowing crucial data including the set
of future world-states; regulatory policy's effectiveness in each future
world-state; alternative regulatory approaches today and in the future; and
the payoffs of these alternative policies in future world-states. This list appears
rather daunting, but much of these data are already factored into current
CBA, so that areas where cost-benefit analysis is already fully integrated into
regulatory decision-making might be the best places to introduce an option
pricing model. To determine expected benefits of a regulatory policy with
CBA, for example, one must have a sense of the probability distribution of
future states of the world and the policy's expected payoffs in each.0 And to
arrive at the policy that maximizes net benefits using traditional CBA, the
regulator must compare one policy to another while knowing multiple
policies' expected payoffs in each of these states of the world. Once a

59. It bears noting that while the financial option pricing models were initially developed
by academics, the potential profits at stake have ensured the continued refinement of options
pricing models by private industry. Similar financial motives have spurred the recent
development of real options models. See AVINASH K. DIXT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 6-7 (1994) (discussing real options). Regulatory option pricing, however,

must be reliant almost entirely upon academics for its development, absent an intervening
government subsidy or bounty program that could encourage private involvement, because of
their application to the public sector rather than to private profitmaking opportunities.
6o. This is because, for regulation Rj, E(R,- [p -V(J )] where pi is the probability of
being in world-state i and V(B) is the value of regulation j in world-state i.
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regulator adds an estimate of the cost to switch from one policy to another at
various world-states to this information, she has all the information necessary
for a first-pass option price.6
That said, we do not wish to overstate the ease of implementing an option
pricing approach. While simplifying assumptions about the magnitude and
distribution of expected benefits would ease implementing such a model, they
would also create limits on generalizability. And given the difficulties that
regulators have with even agreeing upon a discount rate 6 -essential for an
option pricing approach-comprehensive modeling would not be
appropriate for the faint of heart. Yet even knowing rough bounds on the
value of flexibility would be a useful piece of information for regulators, who
now must rely on gut instinct if they are even aware of flexibility's importance.
C.

FORGOING CERTAINTY?

This Part has focused on the importance and feasibility of explicitly
incorporating a valuation of flexibility into regulatory decision-making. Some
readers might object that regulators who focus on flexibility in turn overlook
the value that comes from choosing sticky and predictable policies. Certainty
and predictability facilitate long-term investments, but both industry players
and the public may reduce long-term investments because of uncertainty if
they perceive that regulators will concentrate on flexible, and thus malleable,
regulations. Thus regulators may struggle to maximize both flexibility and
certainty simultaneously.
We have two intuitions in response to this concern. The first is that the
costs of lost certainty could be folded into the policy choices that regulators
make. The prospect of lost long-term investment, or of preserving long-term
investment at a cost of compensating existing players with grandfathering, can
be incorporated into existing decision-making practices. In this sense,
forgoing certainty can be thought of as a cost to "purchasing" the flexible
option to switch. For that reason, we should expect the value of the regulatory
put option to be lower where there are substantial reasons to want to promote
predictability and expectation-based investment. It is even possible that,
where future world-states have low variability, or where the value of certainty
is particularly high, that the net value of some regulatory put options could
be negative. Such information would be very valuable to regulators and to
regulatory observers and should be used as a reason to select guaranteed
policies. In some cases, it might even provide justification to "bind the hands"
of future regulators to prevent them from disrupting the predictability in the
system.

61. See supra Table 1.
62. See Rowell, supra note 32, at
over selecting a discount rate).

1512-14

(describing the importance of and disagreement
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Our second response would rely on private market substitutes to provide
certainty to industry players-in essence, an insurance against policy change.
Such a product would allow regulators to focus on the flexibility component
to decision-making without worrying about the certainty side. It would also
ensure that private industry players do not over-rely on existing regulatory
policy, which is a negative side effect from a policy of certainty and
grandfathering. Louis Kaplow's work on legal transitions shows the value that
can result from this approach, and by extension the private incentives that
would exist to develop such a market. 63 While such a private market currently
fails to exist, there is no reason to think it could never prove viable; its current
absence may simply be explained by existing regulatory practices, under
which retroactive compensation and grandfathering provide little need for
additional products.
D.

SuMMARY

Viewing regulatory decision-making as toggling a binary switch rather
than as occurring along an interconnected timeline tends to decontextualize
regulatory decisions, and can thus obscure important ways in which decisions
later on a timeline are different from those earlier on the same timeline, as
well as ways in which earlier decisions can change the cost-benefit landscape
of subsequent decisions. This can lead regulators to implement suboptimal
practices that cannot only fail to maximize social welfare, but can even impose
more costs than benefits over time. Recharacterizing regulatory decisionmaking as choosing a regulatory policy plus holding an option can help
reduce these risks. And as we have shown in this Part, implementing such a
recharacterization within existing regulatory decision-making practices can
be done in a variety of ways, ranging from easily implementable to more
challenging but more comprehensive. All offer at least some benefit over
continued ignorance of intertemporal intrapolicy impacts.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has explored the implications of conceiving of regulation as
unfolding along a timeline rather than as a toggling a binary switch. The
distinction between the timeline and binary approaches is particularly
illuminating when comparing examples of reregulation to instances of initial
regulation. Such comparisons reveal the vestigial effects and opportunities for
learning that arise from the interconnectedness of past, present, and future
regulatory policies. Accounting for this interconnectedness at every stage of
regulation reveals the usefulness of incorporating flexibility value into
existing decision-making procedures.64

63. See supranote 40.
64. Examples of existing or pending regulatory intervention that could benefit from
incorporating timeline approach insights are not hard to find. For example, regulators have
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Although policymakers could rely on agencies' voluntary adoption of the
timeline approach, a systematic legal requirement that agencies consider the
ramifications from interconnected regulatory policy might not be out of
order. Where might such a requirement be situated institutionally? Scholarly
analysis of agency oversight has traditionally focused on judicial review, but
for several reasons the judiciary is comparatively poorly situated for ensuring
agencies adopt insights from the timeline approach. 65 Executive review may
expressed a desire for private insurers to assume homeowners' risk of loss from floods, which
currently is underwritten by the federal government through that National Flood Insurance
Program ("NFIP"). U.S. Gov'T ACcOUNTABILIHY OFFICE, GAO-1 4 -127, FLOOD INSURANCE:
STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING PRIVATE SECrOR INVOLVEMENT 1-2 (2014). One method of

accomplishing this would be for state regulators to mandate that homeowner insurers doing
business in the state cover these water risks, and to discontinue government-backed policies. See,
e.g., DELOTrE, THE POTENTIAL FOR FLOOD INSURANCE PRIVATIZATION IN THE U.S.: COULD CARRIERS
KEEP THEIR HEADS ABOVE WATER 12-13 (2014), http://WWW2.deloitte.com/content/dam/

Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-services/us-fsi-the-potential-for-flood-insurance-privatization-inthe-us-040 1

4

.pdf; Peter Molk, The Government's Role in Climate Change Insurance, 43 B.C. ENVTL.

AFF. L. REV. (forthcoming). Such an approach, however, suffers from a lack of flexibility should
a private insurance regime ultimately fail. Instead, an approach that capitalizes on the value of

flexibility and the opportunity to learn would facilitate private competition alongside
government-backed NFIP policies. If private insurance does not pan out as hoped, it is relatively
simple for the NFIP to reassume the entire burden, while if private insurance performs well, the

NFIP can be gradually withdrawn. And in a market with little private underwriting, the learning
opportunities from whether and how private insurers participate are particularly valuable for

designing future regulation. Another prominent example is the ongoing debate over how to
regulate smartphone rideshare services like Uber. Some regulators have banned these services in
an attempt to preserve the large firm-specific investments of existing taxi providers. See Brian X.
Chen, A Feisty Start-Up Is Met with Regulatory Snarl, N.Y. TIMES: TECH. (Dec. 2, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/0 3 /technology/app-maker-uber-hits-regulatory-snarl.html
(introducing new regulations in response to Uber); Medallion Transfers:Medallion Price Disclaimer,
NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/about/medallion_
transfers.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (providing information on high New York City
medallion transfer prices, a component of startup expenses for existing drivers); Jamal Thalji,
Hillsborough Negotiating with Lyfi, but Uber Not Talking, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014, 7:15 PM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/hillsborough-negotiating-with-lyft-but-uber-not-talking/

2191155 (discussing civil and criminal prosecution of rideshare companies in Tampa). While
maintaining the status quo may promote flexibility, it should be weighed as only one factor

among several when assessing the desirability of various choices. Services like Uber may present
a situation where choosing a policy lower in flexibility is the optimal course because of the
significant benefits that arise from compromising on flexibility by at least partial deregulation
and disruption. See generally PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 30 (describing the benefits and costs
of past taxi deregulation experiences). A better regulatory response, therefore, might embrace

services like Uber, require mandatory minimum third party liability coverage, take steps to
address increased congestion costs from additional drivers, and continue to protect non-Uber
customers from price or quality opportunism.
65.
SeeJennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under PresidentialReview, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755,
1757 (2013) (commenting on the scholarly preoccupation with judicial review in the context of
strategic agency action). Institutionally, and for both prudential and separation of powers
reasons, courts are generally reluctant to require more procedure from agencies than has been

required by Congress. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978). Thus, courts are unlikely to play much if any role in requiring agencies to apply
a timeline approach to their decision-making, at least insofar as doing so looks like requiring
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be a more natural fit, especially as it is currently centralized within Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA").66 Over the past couple of
decades, OIRA has moved towards increasingly systematic review of agency
assumptions and the expected impacts of policies, focusing particularly on
their costs and benefits. 6 7 OIRA thus already plays a "gatekeeper" role in

agencies' significant prospective cost-benefit analyses for proposed rules, and
an increasing role in the requirement that agencies perform retrospective
analyses.68 It could use the same mechanisms for review and enforcement to
extend requirements for these analyses to include explicit accounting of the
intertemporal intrapolicy impacts of the proposed policy, using any of the
possible methods for such accounting discussed above. 69 Such a requirement
could help OIRA and agencies in interrogating the assumptions underlying
proposed rules. Thus the executive review process could be a very effective
way of ensuring agencies account for important insights from the timeline
approach.
Regardless of the specific mechanism through which the timeline
approach is incorporated into regulatory decision-making, however,
modeling decisions as occurring along a timeline instead of (only) toggling a
binary switch promises the possibility of improving regulatory policies and
enhancing social welfare. Recognizing the vestigial effects of regulatory policy
and the opportunities for learning, and creating explicit resulting models for
understanding the value of regulatory flexibility, can lead to better policy
decisions today and in the future.

additional procedure, over and above what is required in individual statutes or by the
Administrative Procedure Act. Furthermore, under the current-albeit controversial-Seminole
Rock/Auer doctrine, agencies are given a remarkably wide discretion in reinterpreting their
own regulations.
66. See Nou, supra note 65, at 1757-59 (exploring the role of executive review); Sunstein,
supra note 47, at 1844-63 (reviewing the internal operation of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs).
67. Sunstein, supra note 47, at 1839.
68. Retrospective review-which could benefit particularly from analysis of vestigial effects
and opportunities for learning-has been required under Executive Order since 2011 . See Exec.
Order 13,563, supra note 48 (requiring systematic implementation of retrospective review). See
generally Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALEJ. ON REG. ONLINE 57
(2013) (summarizing past administrations' periodic retrospective review policies, and calling for
increased institutionalization and systemization of current retrospective review processes).
69. A regulatory option value in particular could fruitfully be incorporated into agencies'
systematic analyses of regulations' costs and benefits.
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